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Corporate Governance, Affirmative Action and Firm Value in Post-Apartheid South Africa: 
A Simultaneous Equation Approach 
 
Abstract 
 
The post-Apartheid South African corporate governance (CG) model is a unique hybridisation of the 
traditional Anglo-American and Continental European-Asian CG models, distinctively requiring firms to 
explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions, such as black 
economic empowerment, employment equity, environment, HIV/Aids, and health and safety. This paper 
examines the association between a composite CG index and firm value in this distinct corporate setting 
within a simultaneous equation framework. Using a sample of post-Apartheid South African listed 
corporations, and controlling for potential interdependencies among block ownership, board size, leverage, 
institutional ownership, firm value and a broad CG index, we find a significant positive association 
between a composite CG index and firm value. Further, our two-stage least squares results show that there 
is also a reverse association between our broad CG index and firm value, emphasising the need for future 
research to adequately control for potential interrelationships between possible alternative CG mechanisms 
and firm value. Distinct from prior studies, we find that compliance with affirmative action CG provisions 
impacts positively on firm value. Our results are consistent with agency, legitimacy, political cost, and 
resource dependence theoretical predictions. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric 
models that adequately control for different types of endogeneity problems, and alternative accounting, and 
market-based firm valuation proxies. 
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1. Introduction 
Agency theory suggests a positive association between corporate governance (CG) and firm value (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), as good governance improves managerial monitoring and decision-making, as well as reduces 
managerial expropriation and wastage, and thereby enhances operating performance and market valuation (Renders et 
al., 2010). However, while a number of prior studies (reviewed below) suggest a positive link between CG and firm 
value, most have been unable to conclusively indicate that good governance actually impacts positively on firm value. 
A number of reasons may explain the empirically weak association between CG and firm value. First, prior studies 
have been criticised for methodological weaknesses, with particular regard to inadequately addressing endogeneity 
problems (Guest, 2009; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010), as well as insufficient control for any potential interrelationships 
between CG and other possible alternative CG mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006).  
Second, due to the highly labour-intensive nature of collecting firm-level CG data directly from company 
annual reports (Beattie et al., 2004), prior studies have mostly used subjective analysts‟ CG ratings, often supplied by 
rating agencies, such as Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005). 
Renders et al. (2010) show that the use of such subjective analysts‟ CG ratings leads to significant sample selection 
bias as they tend to be severely biased towards a few large firms. The associated econometric problems weaken 
statistical power and obscure the association between CG and firm value (Core et al., 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
Thirdly, and crucially, the prior literature notes that CG structures and systems vary across different countries 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazzura, 2009). However, past cross-country studies have not only generally employed 
subjective analysts‟ CG ratings, which are standardised such that they fail to reflect unique institutional, cultural and 
contextual differences in CG mechanisms across different countries (Morey et al., 2009; Renders et al., 2010), but 
also such studies remain disproportionately concentrated in the developed countries of Europe and US with 
comparatively similar institutional settings (Gomper et al., 2003; Baur et al., 2004; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Beiner et 
al., 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2010). However, the role and effectiveness of CG may arguably be 
different in developing countries, such as South Africa (SA), due to the different institutional, cultural, legal and CG 
environment (as discussed further below), and as such, the link between CG and firm value can be expected to be 
different from what has been reported in developed countries. 
 The current study attempts to address the above limitations by investigating the association between CG and 
firm value in a distinct post-Apartheid SA corporate context. Historically, South Africa‟s CG model has 
predominantly been Anglo-American (shareholding) in orientation, with firms primarily expected to serve the interests 
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of shareholders. However, post-Apartheid CG reforms, especially the 2002 King Report (King II), distinctively 
require SA firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions aimed at 
addressing historical socio-economic inequalities between white and non-white South Africans. These include 
compliance with black economic empowerment, employment equity, environment, HIV/Aids, and Health and Safety 
CG provisions. This compels SA firms to depict some of the key features of both the shareholding and stakeholding 
(Continental Europe-Asia) models of CG in their annual reports, and thus explicitly makes the South African CG 
model a hybrid and unique within the Anglo-American world (Andreasson, 2013).  
Given this context, the crucial policy question, is whether the current hybrid South African CG framework is 
sufficiently robust to effectively achieve the contrasting objectives of maximising shareholder value and providing a 
meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). On the 
one hand, in order to effectively address affirmative action and stakeholder needs, post-Apartheid SA firms will 
invariably have to incur extra costs with a potential negative effect on shareholder value (LSE, 2007; Ntim, 2009; 
Ntim et al., 2012a). On the other hand, political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories (Malherbe and 
Segal, 2003; Andreasson, 2013) suggest that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions does not only help in 
reducing political costs, but also offers greater access to resources that can be translated into improved operating 
performance and market valuation. Resource dependence may be particularly important in SA, given that securing and 
renewing profitable government and mining contracts are usually linked to meeting affirmative action, such as black 
empowerment (Malherbe and Segal, 2003). Hence, we examine the link between CG and firm value within this 
arguably unique institutional setting, where there is also a conspicuous dearth of empirical evidence
1
. Importantly, and 
distinct from prior studies, we construct a broad CG index specifically for the South African setting that permits us to 
uniquely investigate how specific affirmative action and stakeholder issues, such as black empowerment and 
HIV/Aids, affect firm value.  
In addition, we explicitly address methodological and econometric problems that have characterised most 
previous studies. To avoid sample selection bias, our sample is based on all the firms that are listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Ltd, with the CG data collected directly from company annual reports. We also 
address different types of endogeneity problems, including simultaneity and firm-level fixed effects, as well as control 
for potential interrelations between our broad CG index and four alternative CG mechanisms that we have data on, 
including board size, leverage, block ownership, and institutional ownership. In doing so, we make major 
contributions to the extant literature. First, using CG data collected from annual reports, we construct for the first time 
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a broad CG index for a sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 2007, consisting of 50 CG provisions based on the 
2002 King Report (King II) for SA firms. Second, we provide evidence for the first time on the association between 
CG and firm value for SA listed firms, extending the international evidence to the SA corporate context. Third, and 
distinct from prior studies, we provide evidence on how compliance with the SA context specific affirmative action 
and stakeholder CG provisions affects the market value of SA listed firms. Finally, and different from most previous 
studies, we explicitly address the problem of endogeneity, as well as control for possible complementary or 
substitution effects between different CG mechanisms using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. 
Our results show a statistically significant and positive association between our broad CG index and firm 
value, as proxied by Tobin‟s Q, implying that SA listed firms with better CG standards tend to be associated with 
higher market valuation. Our 2SLS results show that there is also a reverse association between our broad CG index 
and Tobin‟s Q, emphasising the need for future research to adequately control for potential interrelationships between 
possible alternative CG mechanisms and firm value for robust results. Distinct from prior studies, but consistent with 
political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories, we find a statistically significant and positive association 
between compliance with the SA context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions and Tobin‟s Q. 
Our results are robust across a number of econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity, and 
alternative CG weighting schemes, as well as different types of accounting, and market-based firm valuations proxies. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section examines the South African CG context, 
affirmative action and the prior literature. The following sections describe the data and research methodology, report 
the empirical results, and present robustness analyses, with the concluding remarks containing a summary and a brief 
discussion of policy implications. 
 
2. The South African Corporate Governance Context, Affirmative Action and the Prior Literature 
SA is a particularly interesting African country to conduct a CG study. First, and unlike most African countries, SA 
possesses a relatively sound financial and regulatory structure, deep equity culture, and is the base for some of the 
world‟s largest multinationals, which attract substantial foreign direct investments (Maherbe and Segal, 2003). This 
means that unlike most African countries, any CG failures may have serious implications far beyond SA and Africa. 
Second, ownership of firms is relatively concentrated (Barr et al., 1995), implying stronger managerial monitoring, 
but can lead to expropriation of minority wealth (Henry, 2008). Concentrated ownership also means that the market 
for managerial and corporate control may be less active (Ntim et al., 2012a). While SA firms tend to have high levels 
of institutional ownership, shareholder activism is weak (Maherbe and Segal, 2003), and although rigorous laws on 
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insider trading and listing rules have been introduced (Insider Trading Act, 1998; JSE Listing Rules, 2007), their 
implementation and enforcement is weak (King Committee, 2002; Ntim, 2009). In sum, these SA context-specific 
issues can result in managerial entrenchment, as well as expropriation of shareholder wealth, that can impact 
negatively on firm value. 
Of greater relevance, however, is that CG seems to be fluidly developing in SA. A formal code of CG was 
first introduced in 1994 (King I) and revised in 2002 (King II) (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), coinciding with 
the collapse of Apartheid, the historic release of Nelson Mandela from prison and the subsequent assumption to power 
by the African National Congress (ANC). While CG reforms pursued so far in SA are generally similar to those of 
other Anglo-American countries (see Sections 1 to 3 of the Appendix), the current South African CG model is distinct 
by its promotion of the „inclusive‟ approach (Andreasson, 2013).  
The SA „inclusive‟ CG approach seeks to maintain and strengthen all the Anglo-American (shareholding) 
features, such as unitary boards, voluntary compliance, and majority outside directors, but it distinctively requires 
firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder (stakeholding) laws passed by the 
ruling ANC on black economic empowerment, employment equity, environment and HIV/Aids (see Section 4 of the 
Appendix). As previously explained, these are aimed at addressing residual negative socio-economic legacies of 
Apartheid. For example, preferential procurement provisions of the 2003 Black Empowerment Act require SA 
corporations to as much as possible acquire their raw materials from a non-white supplier irrespective of costs. 
Additionally, SA companies are required to comply with positive discriminatory practices regarding board 
appointments, enterprise development, and equity ownership, amongst others. In sum, these affirmative action 
provisions may arguably impact differently on firm value, and as such the association between CG and firm value can 
be expected to be different from what has been reported in other Anglo-American countries. 
The empirical literature on the association between CG and firm value is not only mixed, but also 
concentrated in Europe and the US. For example, Gompers et al. (2003), Cremers and Nair (2005), and Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) have examined the relationship between a broad CG index and firm value for samples of US firms, with the 
findings showing that CG impacts positively on firm value. In contrast, and after controlling for endogeneity, Core et 
al. (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find no evidence of an association between CG and firm value in samples of 
US firms, casting doubt on prior studies, as well as highlighting the relevance of adequately controlling for 
endogeneity. Previous European studies have also reported similar conflicting results. While Baur et al. (2004) report 
no evidence of a relationship between CG and firm value in a sample of European firms, Drobetz et al. (2004) and 
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Beiner et al. (2006) find that CG is positively related to firm value in samples of German and Swiss firms, 
respectively. After controlling for both endogeneity and sample selection bias, Renders et al. (2010) also report 
positive association between CG and firm value in a sample of European firms, but find an insignificant or negative 
relationship if the two problems are not properly addressed, re-enforcing the need to sufficiently control for both 
sample selection bias and endogeneity for robust results.    
Limited, but more consistent evidence has been reported for a number of emerging markets. Black (2001), 
Black et al. (2006), Black and Khanna (2007), Henry (2008), and Garay and González (2008) have investigated the 
association between a broad CG index and firm value, using samples of Russian, South Korean, Indian, Australian, 
and Venezuelan listed firms, respectively. Consistent with past cross-country studies in emerging markets (Klapper 
and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009), the results of these studies indicate a positive 
relationship between CG and firm value. Of special note, despite increasing evidence that sample selection bias and 
endogeneity problems can confound research findings (Chen et al., 2010; Renders et al., 2010), a majority of the prior 
cross-country studies in emerging markets do not explicitly address these problems, casting doubt on the reliability of 
the results of these studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009). For example, the CLSA 2000 subjective 
analysts‟ CG ratings used in previous cross-country studies by Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) 
include only nine
2
 of the largest SA listed firms, and this arguably limits the generalisation of their findings for SA 
listed firms.  
 As previously explained, the current study on CG in SA attempts to address these weaknesses of prior studies 
in several ways. First, we use the entire usable sample of 169 SA listed firms over a five-year period in our analysis, 
and unlike past cross-country studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005), we are able to ascertain the 
effects of both cross-sectional and time series changes in CG on firm value, as well as improve the generalisation of 
the results. Second, we construct a broad CG index (CGI) based on the CG provisions of King II, which unlike 
subjective analysts‟ rankings (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009), has the advantage of ensuring that unique 
SA context-specific CG provisions, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids are incorporated into the methodology. 
Third, and distinct from prior studies, we study how compliance with a sub-index of SA setting specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder CG provisions impact on our sampled firms‟ market value. Finally, to improve the reliability of 
the results, we explicitly address problems that may be posed by the presence of endogeneities, as well as possible 
interdependencies among alternative CG mechanisms.    
 
3. Data and Research Methodology 
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3.1 Data: Sample Selection, Sources, and Description 
Our sample is based on all 291 non-financial
3
 firms listed on the JSE as at 31/12/2007 and Table 1 contains a 
summary of the sample selection procedure. Panels A and B of Table 1 show the industrial composition of all non-
financial firms that were listed on the JSE, and the final sampled firms with full data, respectively. 
Table 1: Summary of the Sample Selection Procedure 
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the    No. in each          Percentage 
 JSE available to be sampled as at 31/12/2007  industry                   of sample  
Industrials              81   27.8 
Basic materials                     67   23.0 
Consumer services             62   21.3  
Consumer goods                     36   12.4  
Technology              31   10.7  
Health care                7     2.4        
Telecommunications               4     1.4  
Oil and gas                3     1.0 
Total firms available to be sampled               291                    100.0 
       Less:  Firms with no year‟s data available          28     
                 Firms with some years‟ data missing        94      122   41.9  
Total sampled firms with full data               169   58.1 
Panel B: Industrial composition of                 No. in each            Percentage  
   sampled firms with full data    industry                  of sample  
Industrials               51   30.2 
Consumer services             35   20.7 
Basic materials                      33   19.5  
Consumer Goods                     24   14.2  
Technology              19   11.2  
Health care                3     1.8        
Telecommunications                3     1.8  
Oil and gas                1     0.6 
Total sampled firms with full data               169                            100.0 
Source: The JSE Ltd.  
 
We use CG and financial performance data to investigate the relationship between CG and firm value. The 
CG variables were extracted from the annual reports of the sampled companies. The annual reports were obtained 
from the Perfect Information Database, while the financial performance data were collected from DataStream. The 
firms in our final sample had to meet two criteria: the availability of a company‟s full five year annual reports from 
2002 to 2006 inclusive, and the availability of a company‟s corresponding financial data from 2003 to 2007 inclusive.4 
These criteria were imposed for several reasons.  
First, and in line with past research (Henry, 2008), the criteria helped in meeting the requirements for a 
balanced panel data analysis, and its associated advantages in terms of having both time series and cross-sectional 
observations, more degrees of freedom and less collinearity among variables (Gujarati, 2003). A potential weakness is 
that it may introduce survivorship bias into the sample selection process. However, and as Table 1 indicates, the 
criteria still generated a much larger sample size than what has been used in prior SA studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; 
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Morey et al., 2009), and therefore, generalisation of the results of our study should not be impaired by our sample 
selection criteria.  
Second, contrary to much of the existing literature that employs one-year cross-sectional data (Klapper and 
Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005), analysing five-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may 
help in ascertaining whether the observed cross-sectional association between CG and firm value also holds over time. 
Using the above criteria, and as detailed in Panel B of Table 1, the full data is collected for 169 out of the 291
5
 firms 
over five firm-years, giving a total of 845 firm-year observations from eight industries for our regression analysis.  
 
3.2 Research Methodology:  Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
Our main independent variable is the constructed CG index (CGI), which involves an aggregation of the 50 CG 
provisions contained in King II, based on five broad sections covering: (1) boards, directors and ownership, (2) 
accounting and auditing, (3) risk management, internal audit and control, (4) integrated sustainability reporting, and (5) 
compliance and enforcement. These are detailed in the Appendix. All companies listed on the JSE are required to 
comply with the CG provisions or give reasons for non-compliance, enabling us to conduct our analysis. 
 Our CGI is distinct from CG variables used in prior research. First, unlike most previous studies that focus on 
specific aspects of CG in isolation, for instance, shareholder rights (Gompers et al., 2003), and board size (Guest, 
2009), CGI covers all aspects of CG. Second, in line with prior research (Beiner et al., 2006), the index covers 
conventional CG issues, such as board and ownership, but distinct from past research (Morey et al., 2009), it also 
covers SA context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions. A sub-index defined as Social-CGI that 
contains nine CG provisions of the CGI is formed (see Section 4 of the Appendix), to cover specific aspects, such as 
black empowerment and HIV/Aids. The CGI is constructed by awarding a value of „1‟ for each of the 50 CG 
provisions of King II if disclosed in the annual report or „0‟ otherwise. With this scheme, a company‟s total score in a 
particular firm-year can vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), with better-governed firms having higher index 
levels. Although this simple binary weighting scheme may fail to reflect the relative importance of different CG 
mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003), we adopt it for a number of reasons.  
First, there is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical basis on which weights can be accurately 
assigned to the various CG provisions (Black et al., 2006), and thus, using an unweighted coding scheme obviates a 
situation whereby the CGI is unnecessarily dominated by a particular set of CG provisions. Second, an unweighted 
index is transparent and easy to replicate (Beiner et al., 2006). Third, prior studies suggest that the use of weighted and 
unweighted indices tend to give similar results (Ntim et al., 2012a). Finally, an unweighted coding scheme is a well-
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established line of scoring CG information disclosed in annual reports (Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2008; Morey et 
al., 2009), and can also facilitate direct comparisons to be drawn with their results. Theoretically, better-governed 
firms can be expected to reduce agency costs and increase firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and hence, we 
hypothesise a positive relationship between our CGI and firm value. 
The measure of market valuation employed in our regression is the widely used Tobin‟s Q (Q).6 Following 
Chung and Pruitt (1994), Q denotes the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book 
value of equity scaled by the book value of total assets. It measures the market‟s valuation of the quality of a firm‟s 
CG mechanisms. A higher Q generally suggests greater effectiveness of a firm‟s CG structures, as well as a better 
perception of a company‟s financial performance by the market (Ntim et al., 2012a). To minimise potential omitted 
variables bias, we introduce below a number of control variables.  Table 2 provides a summary of all variables 
employed, including the control variables, the four alternative CG mechanisms (board size, leverage, block ownership, 
and institutional ownership) and two alternative firm value measures (return on assets and total share returns) that will 
be used in conducting robustness tests in section five. 
Table 2: Variable Definition and Operationalisation 
Firm Value/CG (Endogenous) Variables 
Q  Ratio of total assets (wc02999) minus book value of equity (wc03501 +wc03451) plus market  
  value (mv) of equity to total assets (wc02999).  
ROA (%) Ratio of operating profit (wc01250) to total assets (wc02999). 
TSR (%) Total share returns made up of share price and dividends. 
CGI  Corporate governance (CG) index containing 50 provisions from King II that takes a value of 1 if  
  each of the 50 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. 
Social-CGI Defined as Social-CGI. It is a sub-index of the CGI containing 9 SA context specific affirmative  
  action and stakeholder CG provisions that form the CGI. 
BSIZE  Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
BLKOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company shareholdings. 
INSOWN  Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. 
LEV (%) Ratio of total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc02999). 
Control Variables 
CGCOM 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise 
BIG4  1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst  
  & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  
CAPEX (%) Ratio of total capital expenditure (wc04601) to total assets (wc02999). 
CROSLIST 1, if a firm is crosslisted to a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
GEAR (%) Ratio of total debt (wc03255) to market value (mv) of equity.  
GROWT (%) Current year‟s sales (wc01001) minus last year‟s sales to last year‟s sales. 
INDUSTRY Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material + oil gas; consumer goods, consumer  
  services + health care; industrials; and technology + telecommunications firms. 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets (wc02999). 
YEAR  Dummies for each of the five years from 2003 to 2007 inclusive. 
Notes: The codes in parentheses refer to DataStream codes for the respective accounting and market variables used in the analysis. 
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First, we predict a positive association between Q and growth opportunities (GROWTH), because firms with 
higher investment opportunities tend to grow relatively faster (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Second, firms with greater 
investment in research and development can gain competitive advantages (Chen et al., 2010), and so may have higher 
Q. By contrast, research and development is capital intensive (Henry, 2008), and as such may impact negatively on 
current Q. Similarly, Jensen (1986) suggests that higher levels of gearing can increase performance by reducing 
agency conflicts associated with having „free cash flows‟ by opportunistic managers. In contrast, greater financial 
distress associated with higher levels of gearing can inhibit the ability to exploit growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986). 
Also, due to greater agency problems, larger firms are likely to maintain better CG regimes (Beiner et al., 2006), and 
thus may have higher Q. By contrast, smaller firms have greater opportunities to grow (Klapper and Love, 2004), and 
hence may have higher Q. Given the mixed literature, we predict that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
and firm size (LNTA) will relate either positively or negatively to Q. Third, firms that crosslist to foreign stock markets 
tend to have better CG structures, as they are subjected to additional CG rules (Black et al., 2006; Renders et al., 
2010), and thus may have higher Q. Hence, we hypothesise a positive link between Q and crosslisting (CROSLIST).  
Fourth, auditor independence and audit quality are positively associated with audit firm size (DeAngelo, 
1981), implying that firms audited by large and reputable audit firms may have higher Q. Hence, we predict a positive 
association between Q and audit firm size. Fifth, to avoid endogeneity problems, we construct our regression model 
such that this year‟s firm value (Qt) is associated with previous year‟s CG mechanisms (CGt-1), and as such we follow 
past studies (Renders et al., 2010) and include a lagged Q as part of our controls. We hypothesise that Qt-1 will 
correlate positively with Qt. Finally, following prior research (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), we predict that Q will differ 
across different industries and financial years. As such, we introduce year (2003 to 2007) and industry dummies for 
the five remaining industries.
7
 Assuming that all relationships are linear, our main OLS regression equation to be 
estimated is specified as: 
                   

 
n
i
ititiitt CONTROLSCGIQ
1
11110                                             (1) 
where: 
Q                                                 - Tobin‟s Q, proxy for firm value. 
0             - Constant term. 
CGI            - Corporate Governance Index.  
CONTROLS           - Control variables for growth (GROWTH), capital  
expenditure (CAPEX), gearing (GEAR), firm size (LNTA),  
cross-listing (CROSLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), lagged Q  
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(Qt-1), industry, and year dummies. 
               -  Error term. 
 
  
3.3 2SLS, Alternative CG Mechanisms and Possible Interrelationships 
3.3.1 The Need to Control for Possible Interdependencies among Alternative CG Mechanisms 
A considerable number of assumptions underline cross-sectional regressions of CG on firm value (Q). First, 
there is an assumption that the extent to which individual CG mechanisms, such as institutional ownership and board 
size are used is mainly determined within the firm (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Second, cross-sectional regressions 
of CG on Q assume that some CG mechanisms are more important than others (e.g., Black et al., 2006). A third 
assumption underlying cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q is that there are no mandatory or statutory CG 
provisions
8
 for firms to comply with (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998), which was largely the case before the worldwide 
proliferation of CG codes in the early 1990s (Black et al., 2006). Fourth, cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q 
assumes that agency problems vary across firms due to differences in ownership, size, complexity of operations, and 
industry, amongst other, firm-level characteristics (Gompers et al., 2003). Fifth, firms‟ external CG mechanisms, such 
as the market for corporate control, investor monitoring, legal, and regulatory rules are exogenously determined, in 
which variations across firms‟ external environments may either help maximise or destroy firm value (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996). Finally, cross-sectional regressions of CG on Q assumes that the use of individual CG structures are 
not necessarily complementary such that where one CG mechanism is used more, others may be used less, leading to 
equally good performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). This suggests that there is an 
optimal relationship between the use of CG mechanisms and Q in which a firm will continue to institute CG structures 
until marginal costs are equal to marginal gains (Beiner et al., 2006).  
As a result, a firm‟s CG choices are assumed to be an endogenous response to: (i) specific firm needs or 
business purposes, including preventing hostile takeovers, the desire to attract qualified independent directors, and 
shareholder pressure; (ii) important court rulings or decisions; (iii) professional business and legal advice; (iv) peer 
behaviour in which a firm adopts provisions used by competitors or common provisions within the industry; and (v) 
its investment opportunities, information, and regulatory environment (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998). A major 
implication is that to be effective, CG mechanisms may need to interrelate and/or interact. Therefore, the presence of 
omitted variables, simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions can introduce endogeneity problems into cross-sectional 
regressions of CG on Q that employ single structural equations (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). This is because the 
existence of alternative CG mechanisms and the possibility for the existence of interdependencies, for example, may 
lead to omitted variable bias and spurious correlations in such single equation regressions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996, p.378; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252). However, most prior CG studies have examined the wealth effects of CG 
structures in isolation using single structural equations. According to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. 
(2006), one way of addressing such potential endogeneities is to estimate a system of simultaneous equations that rely 
on an extensive set of alternative CG mechanisms, such as leverage, block ownership, and board size. More 
specifically, this involves specifying a system of simultaneous equations, whereby each one of the CG structures is the 
dependent variable in one of the other equations. The implication is that the choice of any one of the CG mechanisms 
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may depend upon the choices of all the other mechanisms, in addition to all specified control variables in the system 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.382; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252).  
 We address this methodological criticism (i.e., that an OLS regression of Q on a single CG mechanism, as 
specified in equation 1, for instance, can lead to misleading results) of past studies by introducing four alternative CG 
mechanisms that we have data on, in addition to our broad CGI and Q, to develop a system of six simultaneous 
equations. The four alternative CG structures are board size (BSIZE), leverage (LEV), block ownership (BLKOWN), 
and institutional ownership (INSOWN). We then estimate the six equations using 2SLS to investigate the link between 
the CG mechanisms and Q. The analysis involves two stages. In the first stage, we estimate each of equations (2) to (6) 
specified below (see Table 3), and save the resulting predicted values (i.e., predicted part of each CG structure). In the 
second stage, we use the predicted parts as instruments for the CG mechanisms, and equation (7) specified below is 
estimated along with the control variables and their respective instruments using 2SLS technique. The rationale is that 
the choice of any one mechanism may simultaneously depend on others to be able to impact positively on Q. The 
INSOWN, for example, may be positively related to the CGI. Thus, it may be the case that the valuation effect of the 
CGI may depend on the level of shareholder activism, and possibly on the other CG mechanisms. We describe how 
our system of six equations is developed below, and for brevity, all six equations in our system are presented in Table 
3. 
Table 3: A system of Simultaneous Equations 
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3.3.2 The Corporate Governance Index (the CGI)  
 
It is assumed that the CGI
9
 is determined by the choices of the other four alternative CG mechanisms (LEV, BLKOWN, 
INSOWN, and BSIZE) and the control variables, including growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), gearing 
(GEAR), firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM), cross-listing 
(CROSLIST), industry dummy (INDUST), and year dummy (YD). The basis for the selection of the control variables 
has been presented previously. For example, and due to greater monitoring capacity associated with larger boards, 
larger audit firms, cross-listing, institutional shareholders, and the presence of a CG committee, we expect BIG4, 
BSIZE, CROSSLIST, CGCOM, LNTA, and INSOWN to impact positively on the CGI. We label all nine explanatory 
variables in combination as CONTROLS to form the first equation in the system to be estimated (see equation 2 of 
Table 3). 
 
3.3.3 Leverage (LEV) 
  
Greater debt usage can reduce the agency costs of „free cash flows‟ (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, the second dependent 
variable in our system is leverage (LEV).  Bevan and Danbolt (2004) report that LEV is positively correlated with firm 
size, but negatively associated with profitability. Hence, we expect LEV to correlate positively with firm size (LNTA), 
but be negatively related to Q. Also, as debt increases credit risks and bankruptcy costs (Jensen, 1986), which may 
inhibit the capacity to exploit investment and growth opportunities, we expect growth (GROWTH) and investment 
(CAPEX) potential to be negatively associated with LEV. LEV is also expected to differ across industries (INDUST) 
and over time (YD). We refer to all five control variables together as CONTROLS to form the second equation in the 
system to be estimated (see equation 3 of Table 3). 
                                           
3.3.4 Block Ownership (BLKOWN)  
 
Greater managerial monitoring associated with block ownership can minimise agency costs and improve firm value 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast, block owners can connive with managers to engage in tunnelling at the 
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expense of minority owners (Ntim et al., 2012a). Hence, the third dependent variable in our system is block ownership 
(BLKOWN). It costs more to buy a proportion of shares in larger firms (Beiner et al., 2006), and so BLKOWN is 
expected to relate negatively to firm size (LNTA). Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that it is more attractive to 
hold shares in firms with greater growth and investment opportunities, and as such we predict that growth (GROWTH) 
and investment (CAPEX) potential will be positively related to BLKOWN. Also, gearing (GEAR) is expected to 
correlate negatively with BLKOWN as firms with BLKOWN are anticipated to use less debt (Bar et al., 1995; Ntim, 
2009). BLKOWN is also expected to differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). We label all six control 
variables in combination as CONTROLS to form the third equation to be estimated in the system (see equation 4 of 
Table 3). 
                                               
3.3.5 Institutional Ownership (INSOWN)  
 
Due to their relative financial clout, institutional shareholders can impact positively on CG structures and firm value 
(Barr et al., 1995). Hence, the fourth dependent variable in our system is institutional ownership (INSOWN). It is more 
attractive to hold shares in larger firms with greater growth and investment potential (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996), 
and as such, we expect growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (LNTA) and the presence of a CG 
committee (CGCOM) to correlate positively with INSOWN. Also, INSOWN is expected to differ across industries 
(INDUST) and over time (YD). Hence, we refer to all six control variables in combination as CONTROLS to form the 
fourth equation to be estimated in the system (see equation 5 of Table 3). 
 
3.3.6 Board Size (BSIZE) 
  
Larger boards are associated with increased monitoring and greater opportunities to secure critical business resources 
that can enhance firm value (Ntim et al., 2012a). By contrast, Guest (2009) suggests that larger boards tend to be 
associated with greater free-riding and lower Q. Therefore, the fifth dependent variable in our system is board size 
(BSIZE). Smaller firms have greater growth prospects (Chen et al., 2010), and as such, we expect capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) and growth (GROWTH) to relate negatively to BSIZE. Further, it is expected that firm size (LNTA), 
crosslisting (CROSLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), gearing (GEAR) and the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM) will 
relate positively to BSIZE. Board size is also expected to vary across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). We call 
all nine controls variables simply as CONTROLS to form the fifth equation to be estimated in the system (see equation 
6 of Table 3).  
                                                 
4.3.7 Firm Value (Q)  
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Finally, to examine the link between Q and the five CG mechanisms, the dependent variable in the last equation in our 
system is Q. All the control variables (the basis for including the control variables has been already presented) 
included in equation (1) are labelled together as CONTROLS to form the final equation to be estimated in the system 
(see equation of 7 of Table 3). 
               
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Empirical Results: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Regression Analyses 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of all variables included in our regression analysis. It shows that Tobin‟s Q ranges 
from a minimum of 0.72 to a maximum of 3.60
10
 with an average of 1.56, indicating wide variation in market 
valuation among the sampled firms. Our alternative firm value proxies (TSR and ROA), as well as the CGI and the 
Social-CGI also show wide spreads. For example, the CGI suggests that the scores range from a minimum of 6% (3 
out of 50) to a maximum of 98% (49 out of 50) with the average firm complying with 61% of the 50 CG provisions 
analysed, an indication that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance SA firms attach to 
CG.  
Table 4: Summary Descriptive Statistics of all Variables for all 845 Firm Years 
Variable                           Mean    Median              Std. Dev.            Maxi.           Mini.              VIF 
Firm Value/Corporate Governance (Endogenous Variables) 
Tobin‟s Q             1.56       1.34  0.67               3.60            0.72     1.25 
Return on assets                        0.11       0.12  0.14               0.38           -0.19     2.49 
Total share returns            0.28       0.25                0.89               2.36           -0.48               2.86 
CGI              0.61       0.64  0.19               0.98            0.06               3.95          
Social-CGI             0.69       0.78  0.27               1.00            0.00               3.73 
Board size             9.75     10.00                3.67             18.00            4.00               2.89 
Block ownership                        0.62       0.65                0.18               0.92            0.10               3.38 
Institutional ownership                 0.74       0.82  0.23               0.98            0.09     2.97 
Leverage             0.18       0.16  0.14               0.56            0.05               1.74 
Control Variables 
Growth                            0.12       0.14  0.26            0.89           -0.44               1.32 
Capital expenditure            0.13       0.08  0.15  0.66            0.07               1.48 
Gearing                           0.32       0.19                0.31                0.78            0.01               3.94 
Firm size             5.86       6.02  0.48  7.83            4.24               3.75 
CG committee             0.32       0.00  0.47  1.00            0.00               3.92 
Audit firm size                           0.73       1.00  0.44  1.00            0.00               3.87 
Crosslisting             0.22                 0.00  0.41  1.00            0.00               3.83 
Notes: Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. VIF is variance inflation factor regression 
value to test for the presence of multicollinearity. 
 
Table 4 also indicates that, on average, compliance with the Social-CGI is higher than with the overall CGI. 
For example, the median firm in our sample complied with 78% of the Social-CGI compared with 64% for the CGI, 
evidence (as discussed further below) that may be explained by political cost, legitimacy and resource independence 
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theories. The alternative CG mechanisms (LEV, BSIZE, BLKOWN and INSOWN), as well as the control variables, 
suggest wide spreads. This implies that the CG provisions and the sampled firms have been appropriately selected, and 
thus reduces the possibilities of sample selection bias that have arguably plagued much of the prior studies (Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Renders et al., 2010).  
OLS regression is used to test all our hypotheses, and OLS assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, 
normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity are tested. Table 5 contains the correlation matrix for all variables included 
in our analysis to test for multicollinearity, and as a robustness check, we report both the Pearson‟s parametric and 
Spearman‟s non-parametric coefficients. Both the magnitude and direction of the coefficients of the parametric and 
non-parametric correlations appear very similar, suggesting that no serious non-normality problems remain.   
 Apart from the expected high significant correlation between the CGI and its sub-index, the Social-CGI, both 
matrices suggest that correlations among the variables are relatively low, indicating that no major multicollinearity 
problems exist. However, some of the correlations are relatively high (for example the correlation between board size 
and CGI is 0.53). Therefore, and to be certain, we computed Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values for our regressions 
in order to further test for the presence of multicollinearity. Noticeably, none of the VIF values for all our variables 
contained in Table 4 is above the critical value of 4, suggesting further that multicollinearity is not a major problem in 
our regression analyses. We further investigated (for brevity not reported here, but available upon request) scatter 
plots for P-P and Q-Q, studentised residuals, Cook‟s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics. The tests suggested no 
serious violation of the OLS assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and autocorrelation, respectively. 
Of interest, and in line with prior studies (Klapper and Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009), the CGI is significant and 
positively related to Q, suggesting that better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation. 
Additionally, there are significant relationships between the alternative CG mechanisms. For example, block 
ownership correlates negatively with the CGI, implying that it appears to serve as a substitute for better CG practices. 
In contrast, board size and institutional ownership correlate positively with the CGI, indicating that the three CG 
mechanisms are complements.  
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Table 5: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Matrices of all Variables for all 845 Firm Years 
Variable                Q              CGI         S-CGI        BSIZE     BLKOWN    INSOWN        LEV       GROWTH    CAPEX      LNTA      GEAR        BIG4     CROSLIST    CGCOM 
Q                 .38***  .26***     .17***         -.03              .20***         -.13***    .09*           -.39***        .12***       -.40***       .13*** .17***      .18*** 
 
CGI             .34***    .75***     .56***        -.16***           .30***          .04    .01      -.12**         .59***       -.08†          .40***  .41***      .44*** 
 
S-CGI            .24***         .73***      .55***        -.08†             .30***          .04    .10*          -.04            .52***        -.08†         .31***  .39***      .47***   
       
BSIZE            .12***         .58*** .51***        -.10
*              .31*** .17***    .10*            .07            .53***         .08†          .39***   .38***      .31*** 
        
BLKOWN         .04            -.18***      -.08†   -.07                         .41*** .04    .02       .06          -.14***          .02          -.02 -.03    -.14** 
 
INSOWN          .15***          .31***        .32***         .28***          .37***  .05    .07     -.07            .28
***        -.05           .10*   .26***      .24*** 
 
LEV         -.12***         -.00            .03    .13***          .10*              .10*   -.07            .33
***        .19***          .59***         .01   .09*      .16***  
 
GROWTH        .08†             .04            .09*    .09*             .03               .05            -.09*      -.04            .13
***       -.10*            .01   -.02      .03 
 
CAPEX         -.31***         -.20***      -.12***       -.08†             .05             -.08†            .32***       -.06                       .09*            .41***         .08†    .05     -.01 
 
LNTA          .08†             .53***        .51***         .50***        -.18***           .26***         .13***         .12***        -.04                              .10*            .43***           .44***        .40*** 
 
GEAR         -.30***          .23***       -.18***        -.08†             .05              -.08†           .57***         -.07             .39***        -.04                 -.02    -.05       .06  
 
BIG4          .14***          .41***         .31***         .37***         -.06               .13**         -.03             .02             -.01            .42***        -.08†      .25***       .28*** 
 
CROSLIST      .17***          .40***        .38***         .37***          -.04              .18***         .04             -.01            -.10*           .42***        -.10*             .26***          .44*** 
 
CGCOM         .19***           .42***        .47***         .31***          -.13**            .24***        .13***          .04             -.09*           .37***        -.14***          .28***           .45*** 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table presents Pearson‟s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table reports Spearman‟s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  ***, **,  * and 
† denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Variables are defined as follows: Tobin‟s Q (Q), the corporate governance index (the CGI), the Social-CGI 
(S-CGI), board size (BSIZE), block ownership (BLKOWN), institutional ownership (INSOWN), leverage (LEV), growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), audit 
firm size (BIG4), cross-listing (CROSLIST), and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM). Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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4.2 Empirical Results: OLS (Multivariate) Regression Analyses 
Table 6 reports OLS regression results of Q on the CGI. Column 3 of Table 6 first presents the results of a simple 
regression of Q on the CGI only, whilst columns 4 to 9 contain the results of a regression of Q on the CGI and the 
control variables for the pooled
11
 sample in addition to a regression for each of the 5 firm-years, respectively. As 
hypothesised, column 3 of Table 6 shows that the CGI is positive (0.003) and statistically significant (p<.001). 
However, the significant coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 6 seems to suggest that there may be 
omitted variables bias. Therefore, the control variables are added to the regressions and reported in columns 4 to 9 of 
Table 6 to control for potential omitted variables bias.  
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on the CGI remains statistically significant and positive over 
the entire sample period. This implies that investors reward SA listed firms that have better CG standards with higher 
market valuation. An economic implication of our finding is that a positive one standard deviation change in the 
average firm‟s CGI score from 61% to 80%, can be expected to be associated with an increase in its average market 
valuation (Q) by about 6% (19 x 0.003) from 1.56 to 1.65, ceteris paribus. Our results generally provide support to 
those of prior studies (Black et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010), but specifically to those of past cross-country studies 
whose samples include a small number of SA firms (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 
2009).  
The coefficients on the control variables in the lower part of columns 4 to 9 of Table 6 generally show the 
predicted signs. For example, and as hypothesised, audit firm size, crosslisting, growth and Qt-1 are positive and 
significantly associated with Qt, while the coefficient on firm size is negative and significantly related to Q over the 
entire sample period. In line with the results of Henry (2008), the coefficients on the year dummies are significant, 
indicating that Q differs over time, but the insignificant coefficients on the industry dummies, except for consumer 
services firms, do not support the results of Beiner et al. (2006).  
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Table 6: OLS Regression Results of Tobin‟s Q (Q) on the Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and Control Variables 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years All firm years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
Sample size (N) 
        .04 
       .66 
     1.98 
     9.15
*** 
      845 
          .38 
          .47 
        2.45 
      12.38
*** 
         845 
          .18 
          .54 
        2.06 
        5.97
***
 
         169 
        .25 
        .49 
      2.20 
      7.43
*** 
       169 
       .19 
       .52 
     2.13 
     6.74
*** 
      169 
       .16 
       .58 
     2.01 
     4.95
*** 
      169 
     .21 
     .51 
   2.16 
   6.83
*** 
    169 
Constant 
CGI 
Audit firm size 
Capital expenditure 
Crosslisting 
Firm size 
Gearing 
Growth 
Qt-1 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
Year 2007 
 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
    .86(.00)
***
 
  .003(.00)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
     .67(.00)
***
 
    .004(.00)
***
 
     .11(.09)
† 
    -.08(.64) 
     .11(.01)
**
 
    -.18(.00)
***
 
    -.04(.68) 
     .05(.00)
***
 
     .29(.00)
***
 
     .05(.43) 
     .49(.00)
***
 
     .04(.51) 
     .14(.38) 
     .20(.05)
*
 
     .18(.01)
**
 
     .20(.03)
*
 
     .23(.00)
***
 
      .43(.00)
***
 
     .003(.01)
**
 
      .10(.10)
† 
     -.07(.59) 
      .19(.01)
**
 
     -.12(.01)
**
 
     -.01(.44) 
      .09(.08)
†
 
      .38(.00)
***
 
      .09(.42) 
      .43(.05)
*
 
      .04(.63) 
      .15(.42) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
    .44(.00)
***
 
   .004(.02)
*
 
    .24(.04)
* 
   -.03(.40) 
    .23(.00)
*** 
   -.18(.00)
***
 
   -.05(.36) 
    .06(.04)
*
 
    .26(.00)
***
 
    .01(.58) 
    .46(.01)
**
 
    .05(.64) 
    .18(.27) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
    .62(.00)
***
 
   .002(.01)
**
 
    .38(.01)
** 
   -.08(.65) 
    .20(.05)
*
 
   -.13(.01)
**
 
   -.04(.37) 
    .12(.01)
**
 
    .31(.00)
***
 
    .19(.23) 
    .53(.01)
** 
    .03(.44) 
    .21(.48) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
   .56(.00)
***
 
   .001(.09)
†
 
    .12(.06)
† 
   -.07(.48) 
    .18(.05)
*
 
   -.14(.03)
*
 
   -.02(.39) 
    .03(.08)
†
 
    .22(.00)
***
 
    .09(.30) 
    .25(.06)
†
 
    .08(.45) 
    .20(.20) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
   .58(.00)
***
 
  .005(.01)
**
 
   .14(.13) 
  -.12(.10)
†
 
   .26(.00)
***
 
  -.06(.08)
†
 
  -.05(.45) 
   .01(.10)
†
 
   .34(.00)
***
 
   .07(.32) 
   .54(.01)
**
 
   .09(.38) 
   .22(.20) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **, * and † denote p-value is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). The consumer goods industry and year 2003 are 
captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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As previously explained, the uniqueness of our CGI is that it incorporates nine SA context-specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions (see Section 4 of the Appendix). These issues are of great 
importance within the SA corporate context, due to the on-going policy debate as to whether given the voluntary 
nature of the CG regime, SA firms will voluntarily comply with these CG provisions (Maherbe and Segal, 2003). 
However, there are mixed theoretical positions regarding the impact that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions 
will have on firm value. Stakeholder theory (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007) suggests that 
compliance with stakeholder CG provisions imposes additional financial costs on SA firms. In contrast, political cost, 
legitimacy and resources dependence theories (Andreasson, 2013) indicate that compliance with stakeholder CG 
provisions does not only help in reducing political costs, such as the risk of nationalisation, but also offer greater 
access to resources, such as profitable government contracts. To investigate the impact of complying with affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions on firm value, we run a separate regression of Q on the Social-CGI. We hypothesise 
a significant association between the Social-CGI and Q, but given the mixed literature, we do not specify the direction 
of the coefficient. 
Table 7 contains OLS regression results of Q on the Social-CGI. Column 3 of Table 7 first reports the results 
of a simple regression of Q on the Social-CGI alone, whereas columns 4 to 9 present the results of a regression of Q 
on the Social-CGI and the control variables for the full sample in addition to a regression for each of the five firm-
years, respectively. Column 3 of Table 7 shows that the coefficient on the Social-CGI is positive (0.002) and 
significant (p<.001). The coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 7 is also, however, significant, which 
implies that there may be omitted variables bias. As a result, to test that whether the positive relationship between the 
Social-CGI and Q is spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the regressions in 
columns 4 to 9 of Table 7.   
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Table 7: OLS Regression Results of Tobin‟s Q (Q) on the Social-CGI and Control Variables 
 Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years All firm years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
Sample size (N) 
        .04 
       .68 
     1.90 
     8.80
*** 
     845 
         .36 
         .53 
       2.23 
      11.42
***
 
        845 
       .17 
       .66 
     2.08 
     4.98
***
 
      169 
        .22 
        .58 
      2.15 
      6.47
*** 
       169 
       .18 
       .64 
     2.02 
     4.91
*** 
     169 
       .15 
       .68 
     2.10 
     4.80
*** 
      169 
        .20 
        .55 
      2.14 
      6.12
*** 
       169 
Constant 
Social-CGI 
Audit firm size 
Capital expenditure 
Crosslisting 
Firm size 
Gearing 
Growth 
Qt-1 
Basic materials 
Consumer serv. 
Industrials 
Technology 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
Year 2007 
 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
   .60(.00)
***
 
 .002(.00)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
   .56(.00)
***
 
 .008(.00)
***
 
   .11(.10)
† 
  -.04(.65) 
   .12(.01)
**
 
  -.23(.01)
**
 
  -.08(.54) 
   .20(.01)
**
 
   .28(.00)
***
 
   .07(.43) 
   .36(.00)
***
 
   .06(.44) 
   .07(.38) 
   .18(.05)
*
 
   .17(.01)
**
 
   .19(.01)
**
 
   .23(.01)
**
 
    .28(.01)
**
 
  .003(.05)
*
 
   .13(.05)
* 
  -.03(.63) 
   .10(.08)
†
 
  -.18(.07)
†
 
  -.02(.69) 
   .22(.01)
**
 
   .33(.00)
***
 
   .04(.47) 
   .19(.09)
†
 
   .08(.38) 
   .15(.41) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
   .47(.00)
***
 
  .003(.01)
**
 
   .16(.03)
* 
  -.07(.54) 
   .22(.00)
*** 
  -.14(.09)
†
 
  -.06(.58) 
    .24(.01)
**
 
    .39(.00)
***
 
    .06(.47) 
    .23(.01)
**
 
    .09(.29) 
    .15(.42) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
    .48(.00)
***
 
   .001(.06)
†
 
    .14(.07)
†
 
   -.08(.43) 
    .12(.07)
†
 
  -.20(.08)
†
 
   -.09(.49) 
    .19(.01)
**
 
    .20(.00)
***
 
    .09(.33) 
    .18(.10)
† 
    .05(.60) 
    .11(.38) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
    .25(.01)
**
 
   .001(.09)
†
 
    .12(.06)
† 
   -.06(.38) 
    .20(.01)
**
 
   -.18(.10)
†
 
   -.10(.43) 
    .18(.01)
**
 
     .36(.00)
***
 
     .04(.66) 
     .24(.03)
*
 
     .03(.49) 
     .08(.41) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
   .39(.00)
***
 
  .004(.01)
**
 
   .17(.01)
** 
  -.14(.09)
†
 
    .16(.01)
**
 
   -.13(.09)
†
 
   -.09(.45) 
     .26(.01)
**
 
     .24(.00)
***
 
     .06(.48) 
     .19(.10)
†
 
     .07(.31) 
     .19(.32) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** , * and † denote p-value is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). The consumer goods industry and year 2003 are 
captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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The coefficient on the Social-CGI remains significant and positive over the entire sample period, but the 
magnitude of the coefficient fluctuates between 0.001 and 0.008. This implies that, on average, firms that comply 
better with the Social-CGI tend to be associated with higher market valuation. The results also offer empirical support 
to political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories. Within the SA context, apart from being part of King II 
and the JSE‟s listing rules, some of the stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity and black empowerment 
are backed by statutory legislation. This implies that listed firms, and especially large companies, are more likely to 
voluntarily comply with the Social-CGI in order to minimise potential political costs and legitimise their operations. 
Indeed, the significant positive correlation between the Social-CGI and firm size in Table 3 supports this hypothesis. 
Crucially, and of particular relevance to basic materials and technology firms, securing and renewing profitable 
government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally linked to meeting black empowerment and employment 
equity targets (Malherbe and Segal, 2003). This means that compliance with the Social-CGI may be a major way by 
which firms can gain access to valuable resources that can facilitate growth and improve long-term market valuation. 
This seems to serve as a major additional motivation for firms to voluntarily comply with the Social-CGI, and hence, 
appears to explain the positive link between the Social-CGI and Q. 
Further, our results so far suggest that both the CGI and Social-CGI impact positively on Q with similar 
coefficients. The similarity of the magnitude of the coefficients implies they have similar economic impact. However, 
the CGI contains both shareholder and stakeholder related CG provisions, and therefore it is unclear, which 
component contributes more to firm value. From agency and resource dependence theoretical perspectives (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), however, we will expect the shareholder related 
CG provisions to have a stronger valuation effect than the Social-CGI. Therefore, and to ascertain the relative role of 
shareholder and stakeholder (Social-CGI) components of the CGI, we construct a new index (known as Economic-
CGI) containing 41 provisions from sections 1 (board, directors and ownership), 2 (accounting and auditing), 3 (risk 
management, internal audit and control), and 5 (encouraging voluntary compliance and enforcement). Our expectation 
is that in a regression containing both (Economic-CGI and Social-CGI), the strongest contributor to firm value will 
dominate the other. Therefore, we re-estimate equation 1 by replacing the CGI with both the Economic-CGI and 
Social-CGI. The results (which for brevity not reported, but available on request) suggest that the coefficient on the 
Economic-CGI is positive (0.008) and statistically significant (p<.001), whilst that on the Social-CGI is positive 
(0.001), but statistically insignificant (p>.10).  This offers new evidence which suggests that shareholder related CG 
provisions have a stronger positive effect on market valuation than their stakeholder counterparts. Theoretically, our 
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evidence suggests that firms with good shareholder related CG practices receive higher investor valuation, and 
therefore the value creation is in the main through shareholder rather than stakeholder related CG practices. 
 
5. Robustness Analyses 
Our regression analysis so far does not take into account the existence of alternative CG mechanisms, firm value 
proxies, CG weighting scheme, other estimation techniques and endogeneity. The positive association between the 
CGI and firm value, for example, could consequently be misleading. In this section, we examine how sensitive our 
results are to the presence of alternative CG mechanisms and endogenous relationships (especially simultaneous 
endogeneity), firm value proxies, CG weighting scheme, and firm-level fixed effects. 
 
5.1 Results from a 2SLS Estimation of Equations (2) to (7) 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we use OLS to estimate equation (7), which permits the existence of all the 
alternative CG mechanisms, but does not allow for interdependencies. The rationale is to ascertain what happens to the 
CGI in the presence of alternative CG structures. Of special note, the results (for brevity not reported here, but 
available upon request) indicate that the CGI remains positive and significant (p<.001) in the presence of other CG 
structures. Also, the coefficients on board size and institutional ownership are both significant (p<.05) and positively 
associated with Q, whereas leverage and block ownership are insignificantly related to Q. Noticeably, the positive 
association between board size and Q supports the results of Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008), but rejects those 
of Guest (2009). Second, and following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), we estimate equation (7) along with equations 
(2) to (6) as a system of simultaneous equations, using 2SLS
12
. Specifically, in the first stage, we estimate each of 
equations (2) to (6) specified above along with their respective control variables, and the resulting predicted values 
(i.e., predicted part of each CG structure) are saved. In the second stage, we use the predicted parts as instruments
13
 for 
the CG mechanisms, and equation (7) is estimated along with the control variables and their respective instruments 
using the 2SLS technique. As previously explained, this procedure considers firm value (Q) as endogenous along with 
the five CG structures, which allows each of the CG mechanisms to affect all the others in order to detect 
complementary or substitution effects, but also permits Q to affect the choice of each CG structure.  
 Table 8 contains the results of a 2SLS estimation of equations (2) to (7). Most importantly, the coefficient on 
the CGI in column 8 of Table 8 remains positive and significant (p<.01), implying that our finding of a positive 
relationship between the CGI and Q is robust to endogeneity and/or the introduction of alternative CG mechanisms 
into the analysis. It also provides further empirical support to the results of prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Morey et 
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al., 2009) that better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation. Our 2SLS results reported in 
column 8 of Table 8 further indicate that the coefficients on board size and institutional ownership remain significant 
and positive, whereas those of leverage and block ownership are still insignificant. The positive association between Q 
and board size again supports the results of Beiner et al. (2006) and Henry (2008), but contradicts those of Guest 
(2009). 
Additionally, the results in Table 8 reveal significant interdependencies among the five CG structures and Q. 
First, our results presented in column 3 show that the coefficient on Q is positive and significant (p<.001), implying 
that higher CGI scores is not only associated with higher firm valuation, but that there is a reverse association (i.e., SA 
firms with higher Q values also appear to adopt better CG practices). Consistent with our hypothesis, the findings 
contained in column 3 suggest that larger board size, higher institutional ownership and greater leverage usage are 
significantly associated with higher CGI scores, but higher block ownership is significantly related to lower CGI 
values. This suggests substitutability between the CGI and block ownership, an indication that firms with poor CG 
structures can compensate for that with a dominant block shareholder. It also supports the view that firms optimally 
choose CG structures, whereby a greater use of one CG mechanism may lead to a lesser use of others, resulting in 
equally good performance.   
Second, our results reported in column 4 of Table 8 indicate that block ownership is positively and 
significantly related to leverage, rejecting our hypothesis that SA firms with significant block ownership are likely to 
use less debt. The insignificant link between Q and leverage also does not support capital structure and Jensen‟s (1986) 
„free cash flow‟ theories that greater leverage is associated with higher market valuation. Third, our results contained 
in column 5 of Table 8 indicate that there is a significant reverse association between block ownership and the CGI, 
supporting our hypothesis that the two are substitutes. Institutional ownership, leverage and board size have a 
significant and positive relationship with block ownership, but firms with higher block ownership do not necessarily 
receive lower market valuation. Fourth, consistent with our predictions, the results reported in column 6 reveal that 
there is a significant complementary relationship between institutional ownership and the CGI, and also between 
institutional and block ownerships. The results imply that due to greater financial strength, firms with greater 
institutional ownership tend to have better CG standards. Finally, the results presented in column 7 of Table 8 show 
that firms with higher CGI scores and institutional ownership tend to be significantly associated with larger boards, 
revealing that the three CG mechanisms are complements.  
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Table 8: Regression Results from a Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Equations (2) to (7) 
Dependent variable 
(Equation) 
Exp. 
Sign 
SACGI 
(2) 
Leverage 
(3) 
Blk. ownership 
(4) 
Inst. ownership 
(5) 
Board size 
(6) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(7) 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
Sample size (N) 
           .42
 
          .43 
        2.38 
      12.69
***
 
         845 
          .12
 
          .71 
        1.98 
        4.84
***
 
         845 
         .20
 
         .63 
       2.18 
       7.50
***
 
        845 
         .26
 
         .50 
       2.21 
       8.61
***
 
       845 
         .40
 
         .47 
       2.23 
       9.90
***
 
        845 
         .45
 
         .40 
       2.40 
     11.66
***
 
        845 
Constant 
CGI 
Leverage 
Block ownership 
Institutional ownership 
Board size 
Qt 
Qt-1 
CG committee 
Audit firm size 
Capital expenditure 
Crosslisting 
Firm size 
Gearing 
Growth 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
Year 2007 
 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
 
 
   -.20(.00)
***
 
- 
     .04(.05)
*
 
   -.08(.06)
†
 
    .06(.01)
**
 
    .11(.00)
***
 
    .13(.00)
***
 
- 
   .14(.01)
** 
   .17(.01)
**
 
   .06(.54) 
   .13(.01)
**
 
   .17(.00)
***
 
   .01(.47) 
   .06(.28) 
  -.08(.33) 
   .29(.05)
*
 
   .20(.10)
†
 
   .23(.09)
†
 
   .38(.00)
***
 
   .47(.00)
***
 
   .12(.05)
*
 
   .48(.00)
***
 
   -.08(.20) 
    .01(.18) 
- 
    .10(.07)
† 
    .05(.43) 
    .02(.17) 
   -.03(.50) 
- 
-
 
- 
    .12(.05)
*
 
- 
    .08(.05)
*
 
- 
    .18(.01)
**
 
    .22(.00)
***
 
   -.07(.67) 
    .28(.00)
***
 
    .05(.76) 
    .14(.09)
†
 
   -.07(.71) 
    .08(.65) 
    .10(.43) 
   -.54(.00)
***
 
   -.06(.00)
***
 
    .08(.01)
**
 
- 
    .12(.01)
**
 
    .10(.01)
**
 
   -.01(.28) 
- 
-
 
- 
    .10(.01)
**
 
- 
   -.22(.00)
***
 
    .13(.00)
***
 
    .02(.27) 
    .08(.30) 
   -.04(.40) 
   -.01(.50) 
   -.03(.48) 
    .20(.05)
*
 
    .09(.43) 
    .07(.38) 
    .10(.19) 
   -.60(.00)
***
 
    .08(.00)
***
 
    .03(.63) 
    .09(.00)
***
 
- 
    .07(.58) 
    .04(.62) 
- 
    .06(.65)
 
- 
    .05(.14) 
- 
    .18(.00)
***
 
- 
    .01(.81) 
    .06(.43) 
    .11(.01)
**
 
    .04(.42) 
    .09(.59) 
    .11(.08)
†
 
   -.04(.40) 
   -.06(.28) 
   -.08(.30) 
    -.98(.00)
***
 
     .09(.01)
**
 
     .01(.69) 
     .05(.31) 
     .09(.05)
*
 
- 
      .10(.18) 
- 
      .19(.07)
† 
      .10(.09)
† 
     -.08(.00)
***
 
      .10(.09)
† 
      .96(.00)
***
 
     -.08(.30) 
      .01(.65) 
     -.94(.00)
***
 
     -.30(.01)
**
 
      .65(.00)
***
 
     -.12(.18) 
      .22(.01)
**
 
     -.14(.49) 
     -.20(.40) 
     -.24(.39) 
    -.44(.00)
***
 
    .006(.01)
**
 
     .04(.48) 
    -.01(.33) 
     .08(.01)
**
 
     .23(.01)
**
 
- 
     .35(.00)
***
 
- 
     .09(.18) 
     .08(.20) 
     .26(.01)
**
 
    -.33.(00)
***
 
     .02(.46) 
     .18(.01)
**
 
    -.13(.30) 
     .22(.01)
**
 
     .06(.47) 
     .18(.30) 
     .34(.01)
**
 
     .16(.08)
†
 
     .24(.00)
***
 
     .31(.00)
***
 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **, * and † denote p-value is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). The consumer goods industry and year 2003 are 
captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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5.2 Alternative Firm Value Proxies, CG Weights and Firm-Level Fixed Effects 
In this final subsection, we conduct three further sets of sensitivity analyses, specifically relating to alternative firm 
value proxies, CG weights and estimation techniques. First, we investigate how sensitive our results are to two 
alternative firm value proxies: total share returns (TSR – a market based measure) and return on assets (ROA – an 
accounting based proxy). As previously noted, these firm value measures have been used widely within the CG 
literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010). As with Q, better-governed firms are expected to be associated 
with higher ROA and TSR. Table 9 reports regression results based on the alternative firm value proxies, CG weights 
and estimation technique. Columns 3 and 4 contain OLS regression results of TSR on the CGI without and with the 
control variables, respectively, while columns 5 and 6 report similarly for the ROA. Our results show that the 
coefficients on the CGI in columns 3 to 6 remain positive and significant, at least at the 5% level. This indicates that 
our results are robust when a market (TSR) or an accounting (ROA) based measure of firm value is used instead of 
Tobin‟s Q.  
 Second, and similar to Beiner et al. (2006), we examine whether our results depend on the weighting of the 
five sections of our CGI. As previously noted, all 50 provisions forming the CGI are equally weighted, but the number 
of provisions varies across the five sections. Thus, this simple equal weighting scheme results in different weights 
being assigned to each of the five sections: board, directors, and ownership (54%), accounting and auditing (12%), 
risk management, internal audit and control (10%), integrated sustainability reporting (18%), and compliance and 
enforcement (6%). To ascertain whether our results are sensitive to the weighting of the five sections, we construct an 
alternative CGI, defined as Weighted-CGI, in which each of the five sections is awarded equal weight of 20%. Our 
results reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 9 indicate that the coefficients of the Weighted-CGI in the analysis of the 
cross-sectional variation in Q are positive and significant (p<.10), suggesting that our results are robust to this 
alternative weighting scheme.  
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Table 9: Regression Results Based on Alternative Firm Value Proxies, Weighted CG Index and Estimation Technique 
  Alternative firm value proxies Alternatively weighted CGI Fixed effects 
 
 
Exp. 
sign 
Total share returns 
(TSR) 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(Q) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(Q) 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
Sample size (N) 
        .05 
       .66 
     1.93 
     8.40
*** 
      845 
         .27 
        .52 
      2.20 
      6.50
***
 
       845 
         .03
 
         .65 
       1.95 
       7.80
***
 
       845 
        .31 
        .42 
      2.40 
      7.46
***
 
       845 
        .02 
        .69 
      1.86 
      2.98
*** 
       845 
        .24 
        .56 
      2.13 
      4.78
***
 
       845 
        .49 
        .43 
      2.52 
    16.41
*** 
       845 
Constant 
CGI 
Weighted-CGI 
Audit firm size 
Capital expendit. 
Crosslisting 
Firm size 
Gearing 
Growth 
Qt-1 
ROAt-1 
TSRt-1 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
Year 2007 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
   .98(.00) 
  .10(.00)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
     .87(.00)
*** 
    .03 (.01)
**
 
- 
    .02(.43) 
   -.08(.09)
†
 
    .04(.61) 
   -.13(.05)
*
 
   -.01(.68) 
    .26(.00)
***
 
- 
- 
    .27(.00)
***
 
  -.02(.54) 
   .07(.31) 
   .41(.01)
**
 
  -.14(.09)
†
 
   .35(.01)
**
 
   .30(.01)
**
 
   .28(.01)
**
 
   .37(.01)
**
 
   -.96(.15) 
     .33(.00)
***
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  -.94(.13) 
   .35(.00)
***
 
- 
   -.04.36) 
  -.02(.64) 
   .16(.00)
***
 
  -.20(.00)
*** 
  -.31(.00)
***
 
   .10(.04)
*
 
- 
   .36(.00)
***
 
- 
  -.34(.05)
*
 
   .18(.09)
†
 
   .03(.61) 
   .04(.50) 
   .28(.08)
†
 
  -.11(.13) 
   .10(.17) 
   .40(.00)
**
 
    .08(.29) 
- 
  .003(.04)
*
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
    .19(.48) 
- 
   .003(.07)
†
 
    .16(.05)
*
 
   -.01(.53) 
    .13(.01)
**
 
   -.34(.00)
***
 
   -.05(.36) 
    .02(.25) 
    .24(.00)
***
 
- 
- 
    .04(.31) 
    .25(.05)
*
 
    .07(.38) 
    .09(.29) 
    .10(.14) 
    .23(.05)
*
 
    .45(.00)
***
 
    .56(.00)
***
 
   .24(.16) 
  .001(.09)
†
 
- 
    .07(.36) 
   -.04(.21) 
    .14(.05)
*
 
   -.25(.00)
***
 
   -.06(.44) 
    .12(.05)
*
 
    .31(.00)
***
 
- 
- 
   .07(.15) 
   .14(.08)
†
 
   .05(.35) 
   .09(.29) 
   .32(.00)
***
 
   .43(.00)
***
 
   .40(.00)
***
 
   .53(.00)
***
 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **, * and † denote p-value is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). The consumer goods industry and year 2003 are 
captured by the constant term in the pooled analysis. Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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Finally, as firms tend to differ in the opportunities and challenges that they encounter over time, this can result in a 
situation where CG and firm value are jointly and dynamically determined by unobserved firm-specific variables 
(Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), which simple OLS regressions may be unable to detect. Thus, given the panel nature of 
our data and in line with Henry (2008) and Guest (2009), we estimate a fixed effects model to account for possible 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. This involves re-estimating equation (1), with the inclusion of 168 dummies to 
represent the 169 sampled firms. Our fixed effects results contained in column 9 of Table 9 show that the coefficient 
on the CGI remains positive and significant (p<.10), an indication that our results are robust to potential unobserved 
firm-level heterogeneity. Overall, the results from our robustness tests make us reasonably confident that our main 
evidence of a positive link between CG and firm value in SA is not falsely driven by any form of endogeneity. 
   
6. Summary and Conclusions 
The paper investigates the relationship between a broad corporate governance (CG) index and firm value using a 
sample of 169 post-Apartheid South African (SA) listed firms from 2002 to 2007 and 50 CG provisions based on the 
2002 King Report (King II). SA is a particularly interesting country to analyse. Historically, it has a predominantly 
Anglo-American CG model, with firms expected to primarily promote the interests of shareholders. However, post-
Apartheid CG reforms have attempted to distinctively superimpose substantial affirmative action and stakeholder 
demands aimed at addressing historical socio-economic inequalities between white and non-white South Africans, 
such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids CG provisions on listed firms to explicitly comply with. This makes the 
South African CG model unique and a hybrid of the traditional „shareholding‟ and „stakeholding‟ models of CG. The 
SA corporate context is further characterised by deep equity culture, concentrated ownership, high levels of 
institutional ownership and weak enforcement of corporate regulations, but conspicuously a dearth of evidence.  
First, our main conclusion is that we find a significant and positive association between good CG practices 
(CGI) and Tobin‟s Q (Q), implying that better-governed SA firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation. 
Distinct from most prior studies, our evidence is robust to different forms of endogeneity, as well as different types of 
accounting and market-based firm value proxies. Second, the distinctive features of the South African CG framework 
allows us to uniquely analyse the relationship between complying with affirmative action and stakeholder CG 
provisions (Social-CGI) and the market value of SA listed firms. Our results show that SA firms that comply better 
with the stakeholder CG provisions tend to be associated with higher market valuation. The results provide empirical 
support to political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories. Within the SA corporate context, compliance 
with stakeholder CG provisions appears to be a major way by which listed firms can reduce political costs, such as the 
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risk of nationalisation, and also gain access to resources, such as profitable government contracts to facilitate growth 
and improve long-term firm value. Further, analysis of the relative role of shareholder and stakeholder related CG 
practices suggest that CG provisions relating to shareholders are valued more highly than their stakeholder related 
counterparts, implying that the shareholder value creation is primarily through shareholder CG practices rather than 
stakeholder ones. 
Third, different from most past studies, our results do not change when controlling for possible 
interdependencies among alternative CG mechanisms (board size, leverage, block ownership, and institutional 
ownership) and Q using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The rationale is to ascertain whether our broad CG index (CGI) 
is simultaneously and dynamically determined by firm value (Q), as well as the other four CG mechanisms. Most 
importantly, the 2SLS results show that our SACGI remains positively and significantly related to Q in the presence of 
the other four CG mechanisms. However, the 2SLS results also suggest that there is a reverse association between our 
broad CG index and Q (i.e., higher CGI scores may not only be associated with higher Q, but also SA firms with 
higher Q appear to adopt better CG practices). We also find evidence of significant interdependencies among the five 
CG mechanisms, including a negative relationship between block ownership and the CGI, implying that SA firms with 
poor CG structures can compensate for that with a dominant block shareholder without necessarily receiving lower 
market valuation. This re-enforces the need for future research to fully take into account possible alternative CG 
mechanisms in order to produce robust evidence. 
 Fourth, our results have important policy and regulatory implications. The prior literature suggests that a 
good CG framework is crucial to corporate success, and our results suggest that the market rewards firms with better 
CG practices with higher market valuation. As an emerging market, good CG practices are particularly important as 
this may not only help reduce corporate failures, but also assist companies to attract foreign direct investments, which 
may facilitate faster economic growth and development in SA. For managers and corporations, the significant positive 
link between the Social-CGI and firm value implies that SA listed firms/managers may need to pay serious attention to 
voluntarily complying with the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions and also in preparing the integrated 
sustainability report. In this respect, efforts by the SA Institute of Directors (IoD), the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), the King Committee, and the JSE at enhancing CG practices in SA corporations are laudable. 
However, the substantial variation in the levels of compliance with important provisions, especially by firms with high 
block ownership, suggests that enforcement may need to be strengthened further. In this regard, setting up a 
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„compliance and enforcement committee‟ to continuously monitor compliance levels among listed companies may be 
a step in the right direction. 
Further, and from a broader policy perspective, our results suggest that the presence of larger boards with 
strong monitoring capacity, active institutional shareholders, and greater debt usage can enhance CG standards in SA, 
which can create value not only for shareholders, but also stakeholders. One policy implication of this evidence is that 
for the current hybrid South African CG framework to be effective, the SA government (DTI) and regulatory bodies 
(e.g., JSE and IoD) should direct more efforts at enhancing shareholder activism through greater institutional 
shareholding and encouraging increased board transparency and independence. By contrast and as greater block 
ownership leads to poor CG practices with negative implications for both shareholders and stakeholders, the SA 
regulatory authorities, especially the JSE should further strengthen efforts at creating diffuse or disperse ownership 
structures in SA corporations. This can be done by further increasing the minimum external shareholdings listing 
threshold (especially by local and foreign institutional shareholdings) by revising the JSE‟s current (2007) listing rules, 
and encouraging additional unbundling among large conglomerates and pyramidal firms. This may further improve 
voluntary compliance with good CG practices, which can improve the overall effectiveness of the current South 
African hybrid CG framework in achieving the contrasting objectives of maximising shareholder value and providing 
a meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group.   
Finally, whilst our findings are important and robust, some caveats are in order. We use a binary coding 
scheme which treats every CG mechanism as equally important. Whilst results based on our equally weighted CGI 
and the alternatively weighted index are essentially similar, future studies may enrich their analysis by constructing 
weighted and un-weighted CG indices. Also, due to data limitations, we use only four alternative CG structures in our 
2SLS analysis. As more data becomes available, future studies may need to introduce more mechanisms, such as data 
on the market for corporate control, in their analysis.      
 
Notes 
 
1. With specific reference to Africa, a large number of past studies have investigated the impact of individual CG mechanisms on firm 
value (e.g., Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006a, b; Kyereboah-Coleman et al., 2006; Abor, 2007; Abor and Biekpe, 2007; Khanchel 
El Mehdi, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007; Sunday, 2008; Sanda et al., 2010; Bokpin, 2011; Ntim, 2011; Ntim and Osei, 2011; 
Mangena et al., 2012). However, and mainly due to the absence of sufficient data, evidence on the impact of composite CG indices on 
firm valuation in Africa is very rare (Ntim, 2009). Arguably, this provides unique opportunities to further extend the extant literature on 
South Africa in particular (Ntim, 2009; Ntim, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a), and Africa in general (Mangena et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b).  
2. The largest nine SA firms are: Anglo American, De Beers, Dimension Data, First Rand, M-Cell, NEDCOR, Old Mutual, South African 
Brewery, and Standard Bank Investment (CLSA, 2000, p.63). Apart from being extremely large as the average firm size of the CLSA 
sample is $9.4bn (CLSA 2000, p.9) compared to R6.2bn or $821m in our sample, four of the nine firms: Old Mutual, First Rand, 
NEDCOR, and Standard Bank Investment are financials (CLSA, 2000, p.13). As noted below, due to regulatory and capital structure 
reasons, financial and utility firms are excluded from our sample. 
3. For regulatory and capital structure reasons, as well as following prior studies (Henry, 2008; Chen et al., 2010), the financial and utilities 
industries, with a total 111 listed firms, were excluded, leaving us with eight industries and 291 listed firms to be sampled. 
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4. It takes time for the effects of governance mechanisms to reflect in firm value (Render et al., 2010). Hence, to avoid endogenous 
association between firm value and CG, we introduce a one year lag between CG and firm value such that a firm‟s value in any year (Qt) 
depends on the previous year‟s governance structure (CGt-1), similar to Renders et al. (2010). The sample begins from 2002 because data 
coverage in the Perfect Information Database/DataStream on SA listed firms is very limited until 2002 and also because King II came 
into operation in 2002.   
5. As Panel B of Table 1 shows, for the 122 remaining firms, two or more years‟ financial data and annual reports were not available in the 
DataStream/Perfect Information Database. For the other 28 companies, both financial data and annual reports were not available. 
6. For robust results, alternative accounting (return on assets - ROA) and market (total share returns - TSR) based measures of firm value for 
which data is available is introduced in Section five. These proxies measure the efficiency and effectiveness with which a firm uses its 
assets to generate accounting profits (ROA), as well as maximise market value (TSR). As with Q, firms with effective CG structures are 
expected to be related to higher ROA and TSR. Previous studies indicate that insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors) value CG 
differently (Black et al., 2006). As such, the accounting (ROA) and market (TSR) alternative firm value proxies attempt to measure the 
wealth effects of CG structures from the perspectives of insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors), respectively. As with Q, they have 
been used widely, and so their empirical validity is grounded in a rigorously established empirical literature (Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Guest, 2009). 
7. For lack of sufficient number of observations in three industries, namely health care, oil & gas, and telecommunications industries with 
three, one and three listed firms, respectively, observations from these industries were merged with the closest remaining five major 
industries. As a result (see Panel B of Table 1), the three health care firms were added to the consumer services industry, the one oil & 
gas firm was included in the basic materials industry, while the three telecommunications companies were included in the technology 
firms. 
8. This is still largely true for SA and all countries that follow UK‟s principle of encouraging listed firms to qualitatively comply with CG 
codes by „complying‟ or „explaining‟ themselves in case of non-compliance with the provisions. This is because while compliance with 
CG codes in such countries is voluntary, they are usually appended to Stock Exchange listings rules for which consistent non-compliant 
listed firms may face serious sanctions, such as suspension or de-listing (e.g., Malherbe and Segal. 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).  
9. We acknowledge that it is possible for interdependencies to exist among the various components of the CGI. In fact, and theoretically, 
the construction of the CGI is based on the central assumption that there is the potential for its various components to interrelate, and 
thereby reducing the potential for spurious correlations that may arise from the presence of different types of endogeneity problems, such 
as omitted variables, simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions (see e.g., Larcker and Rusticus, 2010) that are often associated with 
individual/single CG mechanisms (Agrawal And Knoeber, 1996; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Gomper et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006).   
10. To minimise the effects of outliers, and following Renders et al. (2010), we winsorise all the variables at the conventional 1% and 99% 
levels. However, the whole regression analysis was first run with the outliers included, and the results were essentially the same. The 
main rationale for winsorising is to minimise potential serious violations of the OLS assumptions. 
11. To ensure that the residuals of a given firm may not be correlated across different years (time-series dependence) or firms (cross-
sectional dependence) within our five-year panel (Gujarati, 2003), and following Petersen (2009), we apply the empirically robust 
Clustered Standard Errors technique to estimate the coefficients. Further, we estimate separate regressions for each of the five firm-
years, in addition to estimating a firm-level fixed effects model to minimise potential residual dependence. 
12. To ensure that the 2SLS technique is appropriate, and following Beiner et al. (2006), we first carried out the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(see Beiner et al., 2006, p.267 for a detailed description of the procedure) to test for the endogeneity of the CG mechanisms and Q. 
Applied to equation 7, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 5% level. Thus, we 
conclude that 2SLS technique is appropriate and that our OLS results may be misleading (i.e., biased and inconsistent). 
13. The order-condition for identifying a system suggests that the number of exogenous variables excluded from any equation must be 
greater than or equal to the number of endogenous variables included minus one (Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006). Our system of 
equations consists of nine exogenous and six endogenous variables. Hence, at least three of our exogenous variables must be excluded 
from any single equation to identify the system. However, following prior research (Beiner et al., 2006; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010), 
equations (2) to (7) are separately developed based on theory, logic and data availability without excessive regard to meeting the order-
condition. As over-identification cannot jeopardise our system (Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006), all our six equations are over-
identified. Also, we carried out a Sargan test for instrument exogeneity, but could not be rejected (at least at the 10% level) for all six 
equations. We are, therefore, reasonably certain that our instruments are exogenous and our system is not misspecified. 
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Appendix 
  
Full List of the South African Corporate Governance Index Provisions Based on King II 
 
Section 1: Board, Directors and Ownership 
 
1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are split. 
2. Whether the chairperson of the board is an independent non-executive director. 
3. Whether the board is composed by a majority of non-executive directors (NEDs). 
4. Whether the board meets at least four times in a year. 
5. Whether individual directors‟ meetings record is disclosed. 
6. Whether directors are clearly classified into executive, NED, and independent. 
7. Whether chairperson‟s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed. 
8. Whether CEO/MD‟s performance and effectiveness is appraised and disclosed. 
9. Whether the board‟s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed.  
10. Whether the board subcommittees‟ performance and effectiveness is evaluated. 
11. Whether directors‟ biography, experience and responsibilities are disclosed. 
12. Whether a policy that prohibits directors, officers and employees (insider) share dealings around the release 
of price sensitive information is disclosed. 
13. The existence of the office of company secretary. 
14. Whether a nomination committee has been established. 
15. Whether the nomination committee consists of a majority independent NEDs. 
16. Whether the chairperson of the nomination committee is an independent NED. 
17. Whether the membership of the nomination committee is disclosed. 
18. Whether the nomination committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
19. Whether a remuneration committee has been established. 
20. Whether the remuneration committee is constituted entirely by independent NEDs. 
21. Whether the chairperson of the remuneration committee is an independent NED. 
22. Whether the membership of the remuneration committee is disclosed. 
23. Whether the remuneration committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
24. Whether directors‟ remuneration, interests, and share options are disclosed. 
25. Whether director remuneration philosophy and procedure is disclosed. 
26. Whether directors‟ have access to free independent professional legal advice. 
27.  Whether share ownership by all insiders, including directors, officers, employees and employees‟ trust is less 
than 50% of the total company shareholdings. 
 
Section 2: Accounting and Auditing 
 
28. Whether an audit committee has been established. 
29. Whether the audit committee is constituted by at least 2 independent NEDs with significant professional 
financial training and experience. 
30. Whether the chairperson of the audit committee is an independent NED. 
31. Whether the membership of the audit committee is disclosed. 
32. Whether the audit committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
33. Whether a board statement on the going-concern status of the firm is disclosed. 
 
Section 3: Risk Management, Internal Audit and Control 
 
34. Whether a risk management committee has been established. 
35. Whether the risk committee‟s members‟ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
36. Whether a narrative on both actual and potential future systematic and non-systematic risks is disclosed. 
37. Whether a narrative on existing internal control systems (including internal audit) is disclosed. 
38. Whether a narrative on how current and future assessed company risks will be managed is disclosed. 
 
Section 4: Integrated Sustainability Reporting (Non-Financials) 
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39. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing the broad-based black 
economic empowerment and empowerment of women laws, including black equity ownership, preferential 
procurement, enterprise development, and executive management control is disclosed. 
40. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing employment equity laws in 
terms of gender, age, ethnicity and disabilities is disclosed. 
41. Whether a narrative on how a firm is addressing the threat posed by HIV/Aids pandemic in South Africa is 
disclosed. 
42. Whether a narrative on the actual measures taken by a firm to address occupational health and safety of its 
employees is disclosed. 
43. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing rules and regulations on the 
environment is disclosed.  
44. Whether a narrative on the existence of a code of ethics is disclosed. 
45. Whether a firm‟s board is formed by at least 1 white and 1 non-white (board diversity on the basis of 
ethnicity) person. 
46. Whether a firm‟s board is formed by at least 1 male and 1 female (board diversity on the basis of gender) 
person. 
47. Whether a narrative on the actual community support and other corporate social investments or 
responsibilities is disclosed. 
 
Section 5: Encouraging Voluntary Compliance and Enforcement 
 
48. Whether a positive statement on the compliance or non-compliance with the corporate governance provisions 
of King II is disclosed. 
49. Whether a narrative on how a firm is contributing towards the development of financial journalism is 
disclosed. 
50. Whether a narrative on what a firm is doing to encourage shareholder activism, like having investor relations 
department and proxy voting is disclosed. 
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